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PREFACE 
In a "popular" critique of the Reagan Administration's proposed (and now 
enacted) "transportation infrastructure investment" program ("Save 
the Infrastructure - By Auctioning It Off," Opinion and Commentary, ?he 
Christian Science Monitor, December 9, 1982, reproduced as an attach- 
ment to this paper), I suggested the likelihood of inefficiencies and 
unanticipated consequences associated with such governmental initia- 
tives in predominantly market or mixed economies, proposing as a exam- 
ple of the latter the apparent consequences of highway expansion for 
governmental involvement in mass transportation. Subsequently, in 
thinking about the implications of incrementalist political processes, 
this case struck me as an excellent example of the invasive aspect of 
unconstrained incrementalism and as one which was susceptible to con- 
crete empirical analysis. The product is the present paper, which offers 
empirical support for a principle conjecture of the earlier commentary 
(cited above) and a specific case study for the more general analysis of 
"constitutionalism and political incrementalism." 
The paper has benefited from discussions with a number of IlASA and 
nonIZPLSA colleagues. In particular, Wolfgang Schiipp of IIASA and the 
Technical University of Vienna collaborated in the statistical analysis 
and designed the generalized least squares model reported in the Appen- 
dix. The author alone, of course, bears ultimate responsibility for the 
analysis and its interpretation. 
Stephen P. Dresch 
Laxenburg, Austria 
URBAN HIGHWAYS AND THE DE%ISE 
OF PRlYATE MASS TRANSIT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Stephen P. Dresch 
Virtually any action by any party in any sphere has a large number of 
consequences, of greater or lesser importance, for other parties. While 
many of these consequences a re  consciously intended, many, perhaps 
most, are unintentional. Whether intentional or unintentional, the effi- 
ciency of the system within which the consequences of an action are  
exerted ultimately depends upon the existence of mechansims which 
insure that  parties are encouraged to take actions the net  consequences 
of which are positive and are constrained from taking actions which 
involve negative net  consequences. 
Markets constitute an important mechanism employed by one class 
of societies to attempt to  meet this condition in the economic sphere. 
The principle issue underlying this paper concerns the efficiency impli- 
cations of governmental action within one subset of this class of 
economies, tha t  subset characterized by pluralistic political systems. 
Thus, the paper is concerned not with the relative efficiencies of m a r k e t  
versus p lanned  economies but rather with the efficiency with which 
governmental and nongovernmental actions are integrated in the 
former. The central,  if a t  this stage implicit, elements of the  argument 
can be briefly indicated: 
(1) Governmental actions are not subject to  the types of market tests to 
which private actions are  subject. Hence an important source of the 
feedback by which inefficient actions are discouraged or negated 
(notably bankruptcy) is lost. 
(2) In a decentralized, pluralistic political system the adverse conse- 
quences of any action, not the underlying, precipitating action 
itself, provide the focus of governmental response. As a result, 
actions with adverse consequences (gross or net) almost inevitably 
lead to  further actions in other spheres, rather  than to reassess- 
ments of the  efficiency implications of the  precipitating prior 
actions. 
(3) Therefore, politically pluralistic societies with market economies 
contain an internal bias toward the invasive extension of the  govern- 
mental sphere of activity. 
This paper does not purport to offer proof of these conjectures. Instead, 
it sets  the stage for a more fundamental analysis by examining the 
consequences of one class of governmental actions for a component of 
the private sector of the economy and for subsequent governmental 
actions. 
2. The Postwar Demise of Private Mass Transit 
Prior to and in the years immediately followring World War 11, mass transit 
in the United States was a primarily private activity. Thus, of the 1,406 
operating transit systems in 1950. only 26 systems (1.8 percent of the 
total) were publically owned. While the public systems were larger than 
average, they nonetheless accounted for only 28 percent of all transit 
vehicles. As indicated by Table 1, however, this situation changed 
dramatically over the following 30 years. By 1980 the number of operat- 
ing systems had declined by 25 percent (to 1,044), whike the number of 
publically-owned systems increased by 2,216 percent (to 576), compris- 
ing in excess of 55 percent of all systems. Concomitantly, the 
publically-owned proportion of all transit vehicles increased from 28 per- 
cent to  90 percent. In short, over a period of 30 years an essentially 
private mass transit system was effectively absorbed by the public sec- 
tor. The present paper briefly explores the sources of this rapid demise 
of private mass transit in the United States. 
A perusal of the passenger-load and financial statistics included in 
Table 1 provides a relatively clear indication of the immediate causes of 
the demise of the privately-owned component of the mass transit system. 
Despite rapid increases in population and economic activity, e.g., 
employment, transit ridership declined by 34 percent between 1950 and 
1955, by 18 percent between 1955 and 1960, by 10 percent between 1960 
and 1965, by 13 percent between 1965 and 1970 and by five percent 
between 1970 and 1975, for a cumulative decline of almost 60 percent 
over this 25 year period. Financially. in 1950 operating expenditure 
exclusive of taxes was equal to only 89 percent of operating revenue, a 
figure which rose to 92 percent in 1960, to 111 percent in 1970 and to 177 
percent in 1975. Net operating income (equal to operating revenue less 
operating expenses inclusive of taxes) declined from $66 million in 1950 
to $31 million in 1960, $-I1 million in 1965, $-288 million in 1970, $-1.704 
million in 1975, and, finally, $-3,818 million in 1980; as a percentage of 
operating revenue the decline was from 4.5 percent in 1950 to -141.6 per- 
cent in 1980. Not suprisingly, public operating assistance by 1980 had 
reached $3,618 million. equal to 134 percent of operating revenue and to 
56 percent of operating expenditure (inclusive of taxes). In short, mass 
transit (public and private) moved from moderate profitability in 1950 to 
a breakeven state in the  mid 1960s to losses well in excess of operating 
revenues (passenger fares primarily) in 1980. 
At a superficial level, the decline in passenger ridership provides a 
plausible explanation for the deterioration in the  financial s tatus of the 
mass transit industry. while the  financial collapse of the industry pro- 
vides a  similar!^ plausible explanation for the  progressive incorporation 
of the industry into the  public sector. The unanswered question, how- 
ever, is precisely why transit ridership declined as i t  did. If this contrac- 
tion was simply a mat ter  of a shift in consumer preferences away from 
mass transit or of the effects of rising affluence on the  structure of tran- 
sportation demands, then there would be neither a significant cause for 
concern nor a legitimate "second-best" justification for the public- 
sector "rescue" of the mass transit industry. If, however, this veritable 
collapse of transit demand can be traced not to the independent actions 
- 
Table 1 
~ r a h s i t  and Highway Statistics, 1950-1980 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
T W S I T  
v. pass. (mil.) 13,845 9,189 7,521 6,798 5,932 5,643 6,358(P) 
on pub. systems NA NA NA NA 77% 90% 94%(P) 
bper. rev. (mil. $) 1,452 1.426 1.407 1,444 1.707 2,002 2,696(P) 
IOp. exp. (mil. $) 1,386 1,370 1,377 1,454 1,996 3.753 6,514(P) 
et op.inc. (mil. $) 66 56 3 1 -1 1 -288 -1,704 -3.818(P) 
assist. (mil. $) NA NA NA NA NA 1,408 3,618(P) 
p. systems (no.) 1,406 1,483 1,251 1,148 1,079 947 1,044 
Pub. owned (no.) 26 33 54 78 144 333 576 
Pub. % of total P 1.8% 2.2% 4.3% 6.8% 13.3% 35.2% 55.2% 
ehicles owned (no.) 24,570 22,011 23,738 29,592 40,778 51,964 64,128 
% pub. owned I 28% 30% 36% 48% 66% 83% 90% 
ontract awards (m.$) 1.528 2,619 4,039 4,825 6,506 -7.187 9,865 
funds (mil. $) 415 867 2,292 3,001 3,657 4,824 6,427 
27.2% 25.5% 56.7% 62.2% 56.2% 67.1% 65.0% 
ed. aided hiways 
compl. in yr. 20,000 23,000 28,830 18.783 10,935 7,161 NA 
Cost (mil. $) 753 1,287 3,652 ' 4,563 4,353 4.218 NA 
Fed. fin. (%) 51.8% 51.7% 68.6% 74.3% 75.0% 76.1% NA 
iles under const. NA NA 25,538 25,883 20,831 15,952 NA 
Cost (mil. $) NA NA 7,080 12,228 14,547 20,104 NA 
Fed. fin. (5%) P N A NA 73.2% 78.4% 77.4% 79.3% 80.8% 
Sources: I l f m d  met Book (1981). Washington, D.C.: American Publir 
Transit Association, 1982. 
Satistical Abstract of the Vnited S a t e s  (1969, 1972. 1875 
1980, 198383). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Off-ic~ 
(various years). 
Note: NA denotes not available, (P) denotes preliminary. 
of "sovereign" consumers but to  the inducements of public policy, then 
the legitimacy of the underlying, causative policy can be questioned, 
while the justifiability of public sector action in defense of mass transit 
would be a t  least partially demonstrated. 
3. Urban Highway Expansion and the Decline of Transit Ridership 
The thesis developed here is that the primary explanation for t h e  precip- 
itous decline in mass transit demand in the post-war period is the rapid 
expansion of urban highway systems. While other public policies, notably 
regulations of the financial system which resulted in artifically low 
interest rates on home mortgages and provisions of the Federal (and sub- 
sequently state) income tax which discriminated in favor of single-family 
home ownership (especially in socially and economically homogeneous 
suburban areas), contributed to and reinforced the  effects of a rapidly 
expanding urban highway network, the consequences of expansion of the 
highway system are most easily and clearly demonstrated. 
Between 1963 and 1977 (the only period over which consistent data 
are available), total U.S. milage of "municipal highways" (highways in 
urban areas) increased from 475,000 to 687,000, a 45 percent increase of 
wbich the  mandated local components of the Federal interstate highway 
system and related roadways constituted a small but not insignificant 
fraction. Over the first nine years of this period, mass transit ridership 
declined from 6,915 million to 5,253 million, or by 24 percent, before 
recovering (marginally) to  5,723 million in 1977. To what extent can the 
decline in transit ridership be attributed to the expansion of the urban 
highway system? 
To provide a t  least a tentative (and, in fact, an arguably definitive) 
answer to this question, a very simple single-equation model of transit 
demand is proposed, a model which, despite its simplicity, is quite defen- 
sible.' Because journeys to work account for a significant fraction of all 
mass transit trips. the dependent variable in this model is defined as the 
ratio of total revenue passenger transit trips to total employment (full- 
and part-time). The explanatory variables are: 
(1) milage of municipal highways (thousands); 
(2) the implicit price deflator of user-operated (primarily auto) tran- 
sportation relative to the implicit personal consumption expendi- 
ture (PCE) deflator (with 1972 = 1.00 for all variables); 
(3) the mean transit fare relative to the implicit PCE deflator (i.e., 
expressed in constant 1972 dollars); and 
(4) the  ratio of population to emploqrnent. 
Estimating this equation in the natureal logarithms of all variables, the 
coefficients represent elasticities, i.e., percentage changes in the depen- 
dent variable implied by one percent changes in the explanatory vari- 
ables. 
This single-equation model was estimated utilizing annual observa- 
tions for the United States over the period 1963 through 1977, with the 
following results: 
*Because the explanatory variables in this model can be viewed as determined independent- 
ly of transit ridership (the dependent variable), the estimated coefficients of the model will 
not suiier from simultaneou*equations biaa. The independence of the explanatory variables 
h m  the dependent variable is unarguable in the case of the urban-highway-milage, user 
operated-transportation-price-relative and population-employment-ratio variables. More 
over, at least over the estimation period, this independence appears to be generally true as 
well with reference to the relative price of public transit, determined largely by "ex* 
genous" political decisions of the various levels of government subsidizing mass transit. 
- 1.21 ln(municipa1 highway milage) 
(0.07) 
[-17.031 
+ 0.36 ln(re1. user-op. trans. deflator) 
(0.10) 
[3.49] 
- 0.85 ln(re1ative transit price) 
(0.07) 
[-I 1.501 
~2 = 0.997 
S a n d a r d  e r ror  o f  r e g r e s s i o n  = 0.013 
F -s ta t i s t i c  (4, 10) = 753.49 
Durbin -Watson s t a t i s t i c  = 2.72 
( )  Std. error of est. coefficient. [...I: Coefficient t-statistic. 
Interpretively, a one-percent increase in miles of urban highways 
implies a 1.2 percent decline in revenue passengers of local transit sys- 
tems. With reference to  prices, a one-percent increase in the relative 
price of user-operated transportation induces an 0.36 percent increase 
in transit passengers, while a one-percent increase in relative transit 
fares results in an 0.85 percent decline in transit ridership. Finally, a 
one-percent increase in the ratio of population to employment implies 
an 0.46 percent increase in transit ridership, suggesting that  the aver- 
age nonemployed person uses approximately one-fourth the transit 
s e r v i c e s  of a n  e m p l o y e d  p e r s o n  w h e n  t he  r a t i o  of p o p u l a t i o n  to  employ-  
men t i s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  2.5. * 
*A number of reviewers of an earlier version of this paper suggested the possibility that 
municipal highway milage, which increases monotonically over the perjod and which, almost 
definitionally, does not decline, might simply be capturing a downward time trend in transit 
riderahip. To test this possibility, a second version of the basic transit ridership equation 
was estimated, explicitly includmg an exponential time trend (1863 = I),  with the following 
results: 
- 0.008 (year - 1962) 
(o.ooe) 
[-1.1121 
- 0.80 ln(municipal highway milage) 
(0 .m 
[-3.171 
+ 0.33 ln(re1. user-02. trans. deflator) 
(0.10) 
(3.161 
- 0.88 ln(re1ative transit price) 
(0.W 
[-11.01] 
~2 = 0.887 
Standard error of regression = 0.013 
F-statistic (5 ,  9) = 617.86 
h r b i n  -Watson statistic = 2.66 
Aa can be observed, inclusion of the time trend does reduce the absolute value of the elesti- 
city of transit ridership with respect to municipal highway milage, but the change is only 
from -1.2 to  -0.9, and elasticities with respect to the relative price of user-operated tran- 
sportation and the population-employment ratio are also reduced. Perhaps most important- 
ly, the time trend itself is not statistically significant, with a coefficient only marginally 
greater than i ts  standard error (while a coefficient approximately twice the standard error 
would be necessllrg for mgnificance at the five percent level). A s  the coefficient of determi- 
nation and the standard error of the regression indicate, the addition of the time trend does 
not appreciably improve the fit of the equation to  the data. LTI short, there seems to be no 
reeson either to  believe that the hghway milage variable is simply a proxy for a more gen- 
eral temporal process of modal shift (from mess transit to the private auto) or to substitute 
the equation incluhng the time trend for the more parsimonious equation presented in the 
text. 
Table 2 indicates quite graphically the degree to which this 
estimated equation accounts for the reality of the  period. The first 
column presents predicted values of the ratio of t ransi t  passengers to  
employment, t h e  second t h e  actually observed values. Both predicted 
and  observed values decline monotonically from 1963 t o  1973, the  
predicted values from 107 to 63, the observed values from 106 t o  63. 
Predicted and observed values then rise to  65 in 1974 and to  67 in 1975, 
after which declines a r e  again observed in 1976 and 1977, with predicted 
values of 66 and 63 versus observed values of 65 and 64. 
Table 2 
Transit Ridership, Actual and Predicted, and Its Determinants 
ear  Predicted Actual Municipal Rel. User- 
RevPass/Emp RevPass/Emp Highway Op. Trans. 
Ratio Ratio Miles Deflator 
Relative Population- 
Transit Employment 
Fare Ratio 
.26873 2.8905 
.27066 2.8592 
-27515 2.7946 
.27923 2.6801 
.28893 2.6396 
.28463 2.5925 
.29150 2.5441 
.31109 2.5769 
.32821 2.6160 
.329 15 2.5805 
.32131 2.5026 
.29730 2.4863 
.283 14 2.5585 
-28924 2.5154 
.28600 2.4572 
Note: Municipal highway miles are  expressed in thousands. 
Thus, notwithstanding its simplicity the  model correctly predicts 
t h e  1973-74 and 1975-76 turning points. Interestingly, however, t he  rea- 
sons for t he  turning points a re  not  quite what one might expect, a s  indi- 
cated by the  values of t h e  explanatory variables a s  presented in the  third 
through sixth columns of Table 2. Clearly. the rise from 1973 to 1974 was 
due primarily to the  seven percent decline in the relative transit fare, 
reinforced by the  comparatively slight 7,000 mile increase in urban high- 
ways. Contrary to popular perceptions (and despite an increase in gaso- 
line prices), the relative price of user-operated transportation actually 
declined by four percent between 1973 and 1974, while the ratio of popu- 
lation to  employment was virtually unchanged. 
Equally clearly, the resumption of declining transit ridership after 
1975 was due to the  resurgence of growth in urban highway milage, with 
9,000 miles added in 1976 and 39,000 miles added in 1977, the effects of 
which were only partially offset by the rising relative price of user- 
operated transportation. Transit fares remained relatively constant 
after 1975, while the population-employment ratio declined modestly, 
reinforcing the depressive effects of highway expansion. 
To place in bold relief the impact of post-1963 highway construction, 
if urban highway milage had remained constant while all other explana- 
tory variables took actually observed values, the estimated equation 
predicts tha t  there would have been 99 transit rides per employed person 
in 1977, only six percent fewer than in 1963. In reality, transit ridership 
relative to  employment declined to  64, or by 40 percent from its 1963 
level of 106. Thus, of the  observed decline, 85 percent can be attributed 
to  expansion of the  urban highway system, only 15 percent to increased 
transit fares and other factors. 
4. Conclusion 
In summary, the  expansion of the urban highway system (largely a t  
Federal expense, as will be indicated) induced a serious erosion in transit  
ridership, the  consequence of which was the  financial demise of the 
private mass-transportation sector in the United States. As a result, 
mass transit  has been effectively absorbed by the  public sector, requir- 
ing large and growing operating subsidies (not t o  mention subsidies for 
capital investment, with direct Federal capital subsidies alone increasing 
from $51 million in 1965 to $2.8 billion in 1980). 
If the underlying expansion of the  urban highway system and 
decline in t ransi t  ridership simply reflected the  free play of market 
forces, then the  foregoing would constitute little more than an exercise 
(hopefully interesting) in economic analysis. Its only practical import 
would be t o  call into question the  justification for the  growing relative 
subsidization of mass transit. However, the modal shift from mass tran- 
sit  to  the  automobile can hardly be viewed a s  the result of free choices of 
sovereign consumers in reponse to unbiased opportunities provided by a 
free market. With the  passing of the private turnpikes of the 18th and 
19th centuries, highway-system development became an entirely public 
activity, and, as  Table 1 indicates, this is an activity expenditure on 
which has increased dramatically in the  postwar period. Thus, the  value 
of construction contracts (in nominal dollars) increased from $1.5 billion 
in 1950 to  $9.9 billion in 1980, with the  Federally-financed share rising 
from 27 percent to  65  percent. 
In this regard, i t  is frequently argued by the "highway lobby" that 
highway "users' fees" more than cover the costs of the highway system, 
and hence tha t  highway users collectively are paying a t  least the 
"market" price of highway services. While i t  is beyond the scope of this 
paper to definitively refute this claim, a number of flaws in the argument 
are apparent. First, even if t rue  in the aggregate, it would not be true of 
individual components of the highway system. Thus, relative to the costs 
of highway rights-of-way, construction and maintenance, certain highway 
users (urban and rural)  pay substantially less than others and also sub- 
stantially less than the  true economic costs of providing highway ser- 
vices. Second, t h e  nominal costs of highway rights-of-way, construction 
and maintenance generally significantly understate the  true economic 
costs: The power of eminent domain reduces initial property-acquisition 
costs, governmental authorities are exempt from property and income 
taxes, highways a re  financed in many cases using tax-exempt borrowing, 
the expenses of repair and replacement t o  be incurred in the  future are  
rarely recognized as  a cost of current  highway use, ad nauseum. Finally, 
third, much of t h e  revenue collected as ostensible highway users' fees is 
indistinguishable in economic terms from the revenues of taxes levied 
on other activities, e.g.. retail sales taxes; only to  the  degree to  which 
tax rates on highway-related activities exceed those on other  comparable 
activities can these taxes be viewed as even roughly comparable to  a ser- 
vice price, in this case a price charged for highway services. In short, in 
general and especially with reference to  urban highways. substantial 
subsidies are  involved. 
At this point Federal highnlay funds (including those appropriated as 
part of the Reagan Administration's putative program of bridge and high- 
way "repairH) are targeted primarily on completion of the still incom- 
plete components of the interstate system, and these are primarily in 
urban regions where the  adverse impact of highway construction on the 
demand for mass transit  is greatest. Thus, we confront the anomolous 
prospect of incurring extremely high costs for continuing highway build- 
ing in urban areas and as a result also incurring exponentially increas- 
ing costs of mass transi t  subsidies as  new highways further erode transit  
demand. 
In a recent column critically reviewing the now-enacted Federal 
gasoline tax increase and transportation "infrastructure investment pro- 
gram" ("Save the Infrastructure -- By Auctioning I t  Off," Opinion and 
Commentary, 7h.e Christ ian Science Monitor, December 9, 1982), the  
present author briefly summarized the consequences of highway 
development discussed in this paper: 
In major metropolitan areas the  economically inefficient local 
components of the  interstate  system induced an acceleration in 
t h e  shift from mass transit  (public and private) to the private 
automobile, creating the  difficulties of the transit  systems (now 
largely public) which a re  t o  be the "beneficiaries" of one-fifth 
of the  proposed gasoline-tax-cum-user's fee (while they are  
likely to  be further  victimized by the four-fifths to  be allocated 
to highways) . 
The serious (and, for private companies, fatal) blow to mass transit  in 
the  1950s and 1960s was not the  failure of the  Federal government to  
subsidize transit but  ra ther  i ts  insistence on subsidizing highways and 
use of the  private automobile. And just as in 1950, transit  systems today 
would benefit more from four dollars not  devoted to urban highway 
subsidies than from one dollar allocated to transit  subsidies. 
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APPENDIX 
An examination of the residuals (actual minus predicted values) of the  
estimated transit  ridership equation presented in the  text (excluding the  
exponential t ime trend) revealed one striking peculiarity: The variance 
of the  residuals was markedly higher over the  ten years prior to 1973 
than in the last  five years of the estimation period.' Thus, while the  
mean residual was very low in both periods (0.0001 for 1963 to  1972, 
-0.0002 for 1973 to  1977), the  mean absolute  residua1 (0.0101 for 1963 to  
1972, 0.0052 for 1973 t o  1977) was one-half a s  great  in the  second period. 
While a systematic change in the  variance of t h e  error te rm of the  equa- 
tion would not result in biased ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimates of 
the coefficients, these estimates would be inefficient. 
'While this analysis is restricted to the equation excluding the time trend, the markedly 
lmer variance of the residuals in the 1973-77 period was also exhibited by the equation in- 
cluding the exponential time trend. 
To obtain efficient coefficient estimates, maximum likelihood esti- 
mates were obtained using interative generalized-least-squares, con- 
straining all coefficients to equality in both periods but permitting the 
variance of the error to differ between the two periods, with the following 
results: 
- 1.27 ln(municipa1 highway milage) 
(0.05) 
[-27.71 
+ 0.39 ln(re1. user-op. trans. deflator) 
(0.03) 
[12.2] 
- 0.87 ln(re1ative transit price) 
(0.03) 
1-25.11 
Although only the coefficient of the population-employment ratio is 
affected significantly [declining from 0.46 (OLS) t o  0.3 (GLS)], the overall 
improvement in the equation is indicated by the increase in the log of 
the likelihood function [from 47.3 (OLS) to 113.7 (GLS)] and by the 
increased levels of significance of the individual coefficients. 
I t  is  notable that  the breaking point appears to  occur between 1972 
and 1973, with the first oil shock occuring in late 1973. However, why 
the variance of the  equation should be affected, by the oil embargo or by 
any other specific development, leaving all coefficients "unchanged," is 
unclear. Also, in the absence of additional data, permitting a longer esti- 
mation period, we cannot be confident tha t  other  characteristics of the  
equation did not change after 1972. Nonetheless, the  finding of this sub- 
stantial  reduction in the  purely stochastic component of t ransi t  rider- 
ship is interestingly puzzeling. 
